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[Crim. No. 4734. In Bank. Jan. 22, 1947.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. EDWARD WESLEY
BROWN, Appellant.
[1] Kidnaping-For Purpose of Extonion or Bobbe1'7.-To eonstitute kidnaping for the purpose of extortion or robbery, as
defined by Pen. Code, § 209, it is Dot neceuary that the kidnaper intend to commit extortion or robbery at the time of
the original seizure or carrying away. It is sufllcient if the
extortion or robbery is eommitted during the eourse of the
abduction.
[2] Id.-For Purpose of Bobbe1'7.-The acts of. man in forcing'
a woman to drive her automobile to • eertain destination and
to walk up a hill where. while she was forcibly detained, he
raped and robbed her, constitute kidnaping for the purpose
of robbery, within Pen. Code. § 209.
[3] Id. - Instructions. - In a prosecution for kidnaping for the
purpose of robbery, an instruction designating the mime as
kidnaping as referred to in the information was not subject
to the objection that it was confusing and erroneous where
previous instrnctions had denif'd the mime in the language of
Pen. Code, § 209, and wherf' the court. in a subsequent instruetion as to the form of verdict, referred to the erime as kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and the jury used those
words in the verdict.
[41 Id.-Evidence.-In a prosecution for kidnaping for the purpose of robbery in which the jury fixed the punishment at
death, the evidence supported a finding that the prosecutrix
sutTered bodily harm where it showed that she was raped by
defendant and that he also knocked her to the ground with a
blow to her chin. (Disapproving People v. Mcnf)tlifl, 55 Cal.
App.2d 322. 332. 130 P.2d 131.)

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento
County. Da1 M. Lemmon, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for robbery, rape, and kidnaping for the
purpose of robbery. Judgment of conviction imposing dcath
penalty, affirmed.

fl] See 13 Cal.Jur. 558.
McK. Dig. References: [I, 2] Kidnapin:, 12; [3] Kidnapinl:.
IS; [4] Kidnap~ i 1.. .,rr
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DJ-.rold D. DeCoe and C. K. Curtright for Appellant.
Robert W. Kenny and Fred N. Howser, Attorneys General, and James O. Reavis, Deputy Attorney General, for
Respondent.

TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant, Edward Wesley Brown, was
convicted of robbery in two counts, of rape, and of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. The jury found that the
victim suJfered bodily harm and fixed the punishment at
death. This is an automatic appeal under section 1299 (b)
of the Penal Code.
The facts disclosed by the record are as follows: On March
22, 1946, at about 9 p. m., Mrs. Cleda 1I. Jacobs returned to
her automobile after visiting a doctor's office in the city of
Sacramento. AB soon as she was seated, a man, identified by
her as defendant, entered the automobile and exhibited a gun.
saying, "Madam, this is a gun, it is loaded. Do as you are
told and no harm will come to you." Defendant ordered Mrs.
Jacobs to drive her ear according to his directions and they
went an undetermined distance to a point outside the congested area of the city. During the entire ride defendant
gave the orders and kept his gun pointed at Mrs. Jacobs.
Finally, he ordered her to drive the ear to the side of the
road and get out. She started to take her purse with her.
but was ordered to leave it in the ear. Defendant then got
out and, still pointing the gun at Mrs. Jacobs, directed her
to go up a hill on a levee. When they reached some bushes
defendant ordered Mrs. Jacobs to disrobe and lie down.
Defendant then had sexual intercourse with her and kept
the gun in his hand during the entire act. Defendant dried
himself with a handkerchief, threw it on the ground, and
ordered ?tIrs. Jacobs to dress.
After Mrs. Jacobs had dressed, defendant asked her how
much money was in her purse. She told him that the purse
contained about a dollar and a half or a dollar and seventyfive cents. Defendant asked her the question again, threateningly, and when she gave the same reply he struck her on the
chin with his fist. Mrs. Jacobs fell to the ground and defendant removed her wrist watch from her arm and left the scene.
Mrs. Jacobs remained on the ground for a few minutes in a
dazed condition and heard a motor start. She returned to the
road to find that her automobile and purse were gone. People
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living in a tent nearby transported her to town where she
made a t'eport to the police. At that time she was distraught and her jaw was badly bruised.
Defendant, meanwhile, t'eturned to town. He met an ac.
complice, not a party to this appeal, and together they used
Mrs. Jacob's automobile to follow an automobile driven by
Mrs. Elsie F. Phelps. Mrs. Phelps noticed the pnrsuing ear
and drove to the side of the stt'eet, slowing down, to allow it
to pass. Defendant passed Mrs. Phelps and drove diagonally
in front of her ear and stopped, thus compelling her to atop.
Defendant walked over to Mrs. Phelps and told her that she
had been driving too fast, and when she disagTeed with him
he opened her ear door and told her to move over. Mrs. Phelps
refused and defendant held a gun against her stomach, reached
across her body and t'emoved her purse, which was on the seat
to her right. This purse contained a pencil, personal items,
eight dollars, a billfold and a coin purse. Defendant returned to Mrs. Jacob's automobile and drove away, but Mrs.
Phelps meanwhile ascertained the lieense number.
Defendant returned to hits place of residence at about 10
p. m. after parking Mrs. Jacob's ear about a block and a
half away. Soon after, the police arrived and made inquiries
of the owner concerning a person of his description. They
did not search the place, and defendant remained in a back
room out of sight. He went to Oakland or San Franeisco at
about midnight with friends. Two days later he sold his gun
and Mrs. Jacob's wrist watch to a woman in San Francisco
and on March 25,1946, he was arrested in that city. A search
of his person t'eBUlted in the recovery of Mrs. Phelps's pencil
He was wearing a jacket described and recognized by both
Mrs. Phelps and Mrs. Jacobs.
Defendant made a voluntary unsigned and unsworn statement in the presence of police officers and t'epresentatives of
the district attorney's office. This statement was taken down
by a stenographer and then transcribed. Defendant admitted
therein substantially all the facts described above, but could
not recall striking Mrs. Jacobs with his fist. Be attributed
his conduct to drinking and to smoking marihuana cigat'ettes,
although he admitted that at the time of the commission of
the charged offenses he knew that his conduct was wrongful.
Defendant was clearly identified as the person who sold the
gun and wrist watch in San Francisco. Mrs. Jacobs identified
him as her attacker by selecting him from a lToup of men.
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Mrs. Phelps identified him by his walk and his features. Mrs.
Jacobs's testimony was strengthened by the recovery of the
handkerchief, which proved to contain spermatazoa upon
laboratory examination. Doctors and witnesses testified to
the bruise on her left jaw and a photograph taken on March
27, 1946, showed that her jaw was still discolored.
The controlling question on this appeal is whether the
acts of defendant constituted kidnaping for the purpose of
robbery as defined in section 209 of the Penal Code [1] Section 209 is eoneerned with one of the most serious types of
kidnaping, the spiriting away of individuals for the purpose .)1.
of extortion, robbery or ransom, and authorizes the jury to
impose the death penalty if the vietim BU1fers bodily harm.
Section 209 as amended in 1933 provides:
"Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entiees, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain,
or who hold~ or detains, sueh individual for ransom, reward
or to commit extortion or robbery or to exact from relatives or friends of such person any money or valuable thing,
or who aids or abets any such aet, is guilty of a felony and upon
conviction thereof shall BU1fer death or shall be punished bYj
imprisonment in the State prison for life without possibility of I:
parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same, in eases
I
in which the person or persons subjected to such kidnaping .'. 1
BU1fers or BU1fer bodily harm or shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life with possibility of parole in 'I
eases where such person or persons do not BU1fer bodily harm." il
This section makes it unnecessary to determine whether the ~ A
kidnaper intended to commit extortion or robbery at the time"
of the original seizure or carrying away. It is sufficient if the
extortion or robbery was eommitted during the course of
the abduction. Thus, whatever may have been the original motive of the kidnaping, if the kidnaper commits extortion or robbery during the kidnaping, he "holds or detains"
his victim "to commit extortion or robbery" within the meaning of section 209.
[2] The evidence shows without conflict that defendant
forced Mrs. Jacobs to drive her automobile to a destination
selected by him and upon arrival to walk up a hill where she
was forcibly detained while defendant raped and robbed her.
While Mrs. Jacobs lay on the ground after the defendant
struck her, and therefore while the kidnaping was still con-
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. tinuing, he robbed her of her purse, wrist watch, and automobile. These acts clearly constituted kidnaping for the purpose of robbery as that crime is defined in Penal Code seetion
209. (Peop'" v. Tcmner, 3 Cal.2d 279, 296 [44 P.2d 324].)
[3] The trial court, in instructing the jury on the nature
of the penalties for the crime, referred to the crime as "Kidnaping, as it has been defined to you," "Kidnaping as
charged in Count Three of the Information" and "Kidnaping as charged in the Information." The crime had been
previously defined, in the instructions, as follows:
"Section 209 of the Penal Code of the State of California provides 80 far as pertinent, as follows:
" 'Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains such individual, to commit
robbery is guilty of the crime of kidnaping."
Defendant contends that the jury could not reasonably be
expected to remember the charges contained in the wonnation, that the crimt' defined by the trial court was not kidnaping, but kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and that, therefore, the jury was not informed as to the oft'ense for which it
prescribed the death penalty. Even if the jury did not remember the wow of the information, the trial court correctly defined the offense charged, namely, kidnaping for the
purpose of robbery. It is immaterial that the crime was designated simply as "kidnaping" rather than "kidnaping for
the purpose of robbery" since the latter is kidnaping within
the meaning of section 209 (People v. Tanner, supra, at p. 296)
and the instruction was concerned only with that type of
kidnaping. Section 209 itself, after defining the particular
offense in detail, describes it as "kidnaping." The trial
court later, when instructing the jury as to the form of its
verdict, referred to the erime as "Kidnaping for the Purpose of Robbery" and the jury used those words in its verdict.
The jury was adequately informed of the nature of the crime
with which defendant was charged and the instructions were
neither confusing nor erroneous.
[4] The finding of the jury that Mrs. Jacobs suffered
bodily harm is clearly supported by the evidence. "Bodily
M1'tn is generally defined as 'any touching of the person of
another against his will with physical force in an intentional,
hostile and aggravated manner, or projecting of such force
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against his person.'" (People v. TcmMr, "'pro, at p. 297.)
The forcible rape itself was bodily harm. AIly statement to the
contrary in People v. McIlf}oin, 55 Cal.App.2d 322, 332 [130
P.2d 131] is disapproved. In addition to the rape defendant
knocked Mrs. Jacobs to the ground with a vicious blow to her
chin, which remained bruised and discolored for aeveral days.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a
new trial are aflirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J.t Edmonds, J .. Carter, J .. Schauer,
J., and Spence, J .. eoncurred.
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